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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate 
of HERBERT LEE JONES, 
Deceased• 
Case No. 860232 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER/RESPONDENT 
LINDA CAMERON 
ISSUES PRESENTED BY APPELLANT FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the lower court commit reversible error in refusing 
to hold that there was a confidential relationship between Linda 
Cameron and her father Herbert Lee Jones, giving rise to a 
presumption that the purported will was procured through her 
undue influence? 
2. Did the lower court err in not holding that the 
purported will was presumed to have been procured through the 
undue influence of Linda Cameron on the grounds that she drafted 
the document and was the sole beneficiary thereunder? 
3. What is the scope of appellate review in this case? 
4. Was the evidence adduced at trial sufficient to 
overcome a presumption that the purported will was procured by 
the undue influence of Linda Cameron? 
5. Even if the document dated 1 May 1985 is the valid of 
the decedent, is Robert Lee Jones entitled to inherit as a 
pretermitted child under Utah Code Ann. 75-2-302. 
6. Does the language in the 1 May 1985 document drafted by 
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Linda Cameron demonstrate the intent of the decedent to 
disinherit his son, Robert Lee Jones? 
7• Did the trial court err in admitting extrinsic evidence 
for the purpose of overcoming the presumption against 
disinheritance created by Utah Code Ann. 75-2-3-2(1)(a)? 
8. Did Herbert Lee Jones devise substantially all of his 
to or for the exclusive benefit of the mother of Petitioner 
Robert Jones or did he provide for his son by other transfer? 
9. Did the lower court err in finding that the purported 
will was signed as a will and that it was not altered after May 
1, 1985? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Petitioner Robert Lee Jones has appealed from the Formal 
Probate of Will and Appointment of Personal Representative 
entered on April 15, 1986, by the Third Judicial District Court 
for the District of Salt Lake County, the Honorable Homer F. 
Wilkinson, presiding. The Formal Probate of Will has the effect 
of excluding Robert Lee Jones from his father and of giving the 
entire estate to Petitioner Linda Cameron. 
B. Disposition of the Case Below 
On July 19, 1985, Petitioner/Respondent Linda Cameron filed 
a Petition for Formal Probate of Will and Appoint of Personal 
Representative. The decedent, Herbert Lee Jones had died on 
July 25, 1985. Accompanying the petition was a document dated 
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May 1, 1985 which the court later admitted for probate as the, 
will of the decedent. (R. 5-7). On August 6, 1985, 
Petitioner/Appellant Robert Lee Jones filed an Objection to 
Petition for Formal Probate and Formal Appointment of Personal 
Representative: and Counter Petition for Formal Appointment of 
Special Administrator. (R. 9-14). The matter was referred to 
the trial division of the district court and trial was held on 
February 10, 1986, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson presiding. 
The court ruled finding facts substantially in favor of 
Petitioner/Respondent Linda Cameron. (R. 110-113). On April 
15, 1986, the court entered the Formal Probate of Will and 
Appointment of Personal Representative from which 
Petitioner/Respondent Robert Lee Jones has appealed. (R114-
115). 
C. Statement of Facts 
Linda Cameron and Robert Lee Jones are the surviving 
children of Herbert Lee Jones who died on July 5, 1985 at the 
age of 71, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. For 
approximately two months prior to his death he resided in Salt 
Lake County. Prior to May, 1985, he lived substantially all of 
his life in California. Although he lived alone, he operated a 
salvage grease busines in which he drove all over Southern 
California to retrieve used restaurant grease which was sold for 
re-processing. He was divorced and died single. 
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The will that was admitted to probate by the district court 
was drafted in La Puente Valley Hospital, West Covina, 
California and signed by the decedent on May 1, 1985 . He had 
been admitted to the hospital for major surgery. Linda Cameron 
found out that her father was in the hospital and travelled to 
California, arriving on April 30, 1985. It was the first time 
she had been to see her father for several years although she 
had been in telephone contact with him calling once or twice a 
month. (Tr. 38-39). Realizing that her father would have a 
lengthy convalescence, she spent much of the night of April 30 
going through her fatherfs business papers so that some 
disposition could be made. On May 1, 1985 she visited her 
father at the hospital. Her father had her prepare a document, 
in her handwriting which stated: 
I, HERBERT LEE JONES, grant power of ATTORNEY to my 
daughter: LINDA M. CAMERON. 
(Tr. 10-13). The document was left unsigned and put aside. 
Mrs. Cameron then had further discussions with her father. 
The details of the grease business were discussed, to include 
who should collect the grease from whom and when. (Tr. 19). 
The decedent also indicated that he wanted his son Robert Lee 
Jones to have no part of his property. Mrs. Cameron then 
indicated to him that if that was his desire, he would need a 
will. He so indicated. Mrs. Cameron then changed the period on 
the previously drafted document to a comma and added the words 
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"AND TO BE EXECUTER (sic) AND SOLE BENEFICIARY TO MY ESTATE/' 
(Tr. 19-20). After the decedent had a chance to examine the 
document, he acknowledged it as his will and signed it in its 
complete form as it was submitted to the court in the presence 
of Mrs. Cameron, Volita Jones, and Terri Hurst. Volita Jones 
and Terri Hurst also signed the will as witnesses in each 
other's presence. 
Prior to the signing of the will and on numerous occasions, 
the decedent had indicated that he wanted to exclude Robert Lee 
Jones from receiving any part of his estate. Volita Jones 
testified of her longstanding friendship with decedent and his 
frequent mention of an incident where Robert had taken money 
from the decedent's safe deposit box. (Tr.82-83). The 
decedent's brother, Spenser Jones also testified as to the 
decedent's disappointment that his son had stolen from him and 
his desire that Robert should receive nothing. (Tr. 107-108). 
At trial, petitioner/appellant presented testimony that he 
had not seen seen his father for about six years prior to his 
father's death even though he lived only about fifteen miles 
from his father. He testified that he thought his father was 
incapable of handling his affairs, but that was also based on 
incidents which occurred in 1979. (Tr. 187-198). Testimony was 
presented by George Throckmorton that he believed that the 
second portion of words was written by someone different than 
the one who wrote the first portion. That was contradicted by 
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eyewitness testimony that Mrs. Cameron had written both portions 
and that the entire document was in its present form at the time 
it was signed. (Tr. 85, 95). Both Mr. Throckmorton and a Chris 
Andrew testified that they believed that the second portion of 
the will had been traced over with a different color ink. Both 
however conceded that no change in words had taken place. (Tr. 
130, 152). 
Based on the testimony given to the court, it generally 
found the issues in favor of Linda Cameron and entered its 
amended findings of fact and conclusions of law. (R. 110-112). 
The court found that there was no confidential relationship 
between Linda Cameron and her father prior to the signing of the 
will. It found that the entire document had been completed 
prior to the time of its signing by the decedent and the 
witnesses. The court also found that the will was not procured 
by the undue influence of any person. The Court entered the 
Formal Probate of Will and Appointment of Personal 




ANY INTERPRETATION OF A WILL SHOULD USE AS ITS 
PRIMARY GUIDE THE INTENT OF THE TESTATOR. 
Section 75-1-102(1) of the Utah Uniform Probate Code states 
that "This code shall be liberally construed and applied to 
promote its underlying purposes and policies." At subsection 
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(2) it is stated that "The underlying purposes and policies of 
this code are: ... (b) To discover and make effective the 
intent of a decedent in the distribution of his property." The 
legislature made no comment on this section of the uniform code 
at the time of adoption. That is certainly understandable in 
light of this court's history of decisions. For example this 
court in In re Poppletonfs Estate. 97 P 138, that the rules of 
construction used in interpreting wills should yield to clearly 
expressed intent on the part of the testator. Those rules are 
merely guides to help find a testator's intent. More recently 
in In re Wallich's Estate. 420 P 2d 40, this court stated that a 
testator's intent should be of "paramount" interest. 
In interpreting the will which is the subject of this 
appeal, this court should resist the temptation to follow strict 
technical points of law where such interpretation serves to 
obscure the intent of the testator. The law should be a guide 
to ascertain that intent, not a shield to obscure it. 
II 
NO MATTER WHAT THE STANDARD OF REVIEW, THERE IS AN 
ADEQUATE FACTUAL BASIS TO SUSTAIN THE LOWER COURT'S 
FINDINGS THAT THE MAY 1, 1985 DOCUMENT WAS THE 
PROPERLY EXECUTED WILL OF THE DECEDENT. 
Petitioner/appellant has urged the court to review the 
findings of fact in this case as a court of equity. The case of 
In the Matter of the Estate of Hock, 655 P 2d. 1111 (1982) has 
been cited. The footnote at page 1114 is most enlightening when 
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read in its entirety. The court stated: 
"In an equity proceeding, we do not engage in a 
review of the evidence which duplicates the task of 
the trial cour.t. Rather we assess the quality and 
quantity of the evidence to determine whether it 
'clearly preponderates against' the trial court's 
finding that the appropriate standard of proof has 
been satisfied. We apply this standard of review in 
cases involving trusts which arise by operation of law 
and in which the the standard of proof is one of 
clear and convincing evidence." 
The court also goes on to state that where the lower had to 
apply the more stringent "clear and convincing" standard to its 
analysis, it need apply a lesser standard of review. That is 
not the case here. The lower court in this case did not apply 
the "clear and convincing" standard neither did this case 
involve questions concerning resulting trusts. 
In any event, there was a strong basis for the court's 
findings that the May 1, 1985 document was indeed the decedent' 
will. Linda Cameron and Volita both testified that the deceden 
examined the will and indicated that it was as he wanted it. 
Both testified that Herbert Lee Jones signed the will in the 
presence of Volita Jones and Terri Hurst. Both indicated that 
the witness signed the document in Herbert's presence. (Tr. 25 
26, 84-85). The only evidence offered to the contrary was that 
of Mr. George Throckmorton that he believed the will had been 
written by two different people and that some part of it had 
been traced. Mr. Throckmorton himself admitted that he could 
not be sure of his conclusion and that he was not present at th 
signing. (Tr. 150-152). Volita Jones, an impartial witness wa 
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emphatic that the will she witnessed was there in its entirety 
when she signed it. (Tr. 85, 95). 
Taken as a logical whole, the testimony gave the trier of 
fact a full and adequate basis to find as it did. In the 
absence of clear error on the part of the factfinder, its 
finding should not be disturbed by this court. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT THE WILL WAS 
NOT PROCURED BY THE UNDUE INFLUCENCE OF ANY PERSON. 
Undue influence of the magnitude to invalidate a will has 
been defined by this court as follows: 
"Mere general or reasonable influence over a 
testator is not sufficient to invalidate a will; to 
have that effect the influence must be 'undue.1 The 
rule as to what constituted 'undue influence' has been 
variously stated, but the substance of the different 
statements is that, to be sufficient to avoid a will, 
the influence exerted must be of a kind that so 
overpowers and subjugates the mind of the testator as 
to destroy his free agency and make him express the 
will of another, rather than his own. The mere 
existence of undue influence, or an opportunity to 
exercise it is not sufficient; such influence must be 
actually exerted on the mind of the testator in regard 
to the execution of the will in question, either at 
the time of the execution of the will, or so near 
thereto as to be still operative, with the object or 
procuring a will in favor of particular parties, and 
it must result in the making of testamentatry 
dispositions which the testator would not otherwise 
had made." In re Brvan's Estate. 25 P 2d (1933). 
The focus therefore of any inquiry into the possibility of 
someone exerting undue influence over a testator should be on 
two things. The inquiry must look at what the person intent was 
and whether it was overborn. The inquiry must also look at the 
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moment that the will in question was executed. 
The trial court found that there was no confidential 
relationship between Linda Cameron and Herbert Lee Jones and 
therefore no presumption of undue influence. The evidence 
before the court indicated that while the decedent certainly 
trusted his daughter, she had little or no opportunity to have 
any relationship with her father prior to the signing of the 
will. She had not even seen him for several years. She only 
had the opportunity to talk to him on the phone. The testimony 
was that the decedent ran a fairly complex business without any 
assistance. Testimony brought forth by appellant about Linda 
Cameron running the business was only effective after the 
decedent sign the will. While the appellant has cited extensive 
case law citing various examples of confidential relationships 
being assumed or presumed, none of them corresponde to the facts 
of this case. All involved a longstanding relationship which 
existed before the challenged will or document was signed. 
The other focus of inquiry is that of whether the 
decedent's desires were actually overborn. The natural objects 
of the decedent's bounty were his two children. Appellant laims 
that Linda Cameron forced her father to exclude him. The 
evidence at trial was clear that the decedent did not want his 
son Robert Lee Jones to take any part of his estate. Linda 
Cameron testifies that the whole purpose of the will was to 
conform to her father's desire that "Bobby" not get anything. 
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(Tr. 17-17). Volita Jones testified that the decedent 
frequently expressed that same desire to exclude his son* (Tr. 
82-82). The decedent's brother also testified as to Herbert's 
desire to exclude "Bobby." (Tr. 107). Thus it is clear that 
the will which did in fact give nothing to the appellant was 
consistent with the decedent's wishes. The finding of no undue 
influence by the court is thus factually supported no matter 
what the effect of any presumptions. 
It must be noted that even where a presumption of undue 
influence exists, that merely shifts the burden onto a 
confidential advisor to show by a preponderance of the evidence 
that no fraud or undue influence was exerted. See In re Swan's 
Estate, 293 P 2d 682 (Utah 1956). The trial court had the full 
benefit of argument of both counsel concerning presumptions of 
undue influence or the lack thereof. While the trial judge in 
his ruling did not specifically make any rulings concerning 
presumptions, his ruling that the will was not procured by undue 
influence coupled with the abundant evidence that the decedent's 
will was not overborn appears to be that the preponderance of 
evidence was that no fraud or undue influence was exerted. 
IV. 
THE LANGUAGE OF THE WILL WITHOUT THE AID OF 
EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SHOW THE 
DECEDENT'S INTENT TO DISINHERIT HIS SON ROBERT LEE JONES. 
Secton 75-2-302, Utah Code Annotated provides that: 
"If a testator fails to provide in his will for any of 
his children or issue of a deceased child, the omitted 
child or issue receives a share in the estate equal in 
value to that which would have received if the 
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testator had die intestate unless: (a) It appears 
from the will that the omission was intentional;" 
Robert Lee Jones claims his intestate share as a pretermitted 
heir pursuant to this statute. This section comes from the 
probate code and no Utah Supreme Court cases of record have yet 
discussed it. 
In examining the appellant's claim that he should take his 
intestate share of his father's estate as a pretermitted heir, 
this court can profitably turn to a preliminary question which 
was also decided by the trial court. The appellant contested 
his father's mental capacity to effectively dispose of his 
property. In examining that question, the court was presented 
with the definition of mental capacity that this court has 
established. The true test of testamentary capacity is whether 
a testator "is able to remember who were the natural objects of 
his bounty, recall to mind his property, and make disposition of 
it understandingly according to some purpose or plan formed in 
his mind", In re Swan's Estate, 293 P 2d 682, (Utah 1956). The 
evidence concerning the decedent's desire to give his son no 
part of his property was properly admitted to show that the 
decedent understood that he had a son. He had not inadvertently 
forgotten that that he had a son. Almost immediately following 
those statements, the decedent signed a will giving his entire 
estate to his daughter to the exclusion of that son he had 
acknowledged. What should be inferred from this. The most 
logical interpretation is that the decedent intentionally 
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omitted his son from his will. When viewed against the capacity 
which the decedent must have had, that is the only logical 
interpretation which can be reached from the language of the 
will. 
That logic is in conformance with Utah case law. In the 
case of In re Newellfs Estate, 5 P 2d 230, (Utah, 1931), the 
court stated that "language of a will and bequests may be of 
such character as to lead to but one conclusion, that all others 
except those mentioned were intended to be excluded." The court 
then cited as an example an Illinois case where the will made no 
mention of the children of the testator in a his will, but gave 
the entire estate to the testator's wife. The Illinois court 
held that "language could not have been used which would more 
clearly express an intention that the wife and she alone was to 
take and hold the testator's estate to the exclusion of all 
others including his children." See Hawhe v. Chicago and W.I.R. 
Co. , 4 6 N.E. 240, cited in Newell, supra at 237. 
The court in Newell admitted extrinsic evidence in an aid 
to determine the intent of the decedent. That will be discussed 
further. The court found that when multiple bequests were made, 
the Hawhe rule might not apply and thus according to the facts 
of the case felt it necessary to dig further. The trial court 
in this case made a similar analysis. It found that the 
language of the will alone was sufficient to show the decedent's 
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intent to exclude Robert Lee Jones but also added a finding that 
the consideration of extrinsic evidence would only buttress that 
conclusion. Inasmuch as the defendant opened the door to the 
admission of extrinsic concerning the decedent's intent 
concerning his son by challenging the decedent's capacity and 
advocating that the will was invalid because of undue influence, 
the trial court could properly make such a ruling. In the 
absence of clear error, this court should sustain that ruliing. 
V. 
ALTHOUGH UNNECESSARY, EXTRINSIC COULD PROPERLY BE CONSIDERED 
BY THE TRIAL COURT IN DETERMINING WHETHER THE 
DECEDENT INTENDED TO EXCLUDE ROBERT LEE JONES FROM 
TAKING ANY PART OF HIS ESTATE. 
Any discussion of pretermitted heirs and the comsideration 
of extrinsic evidence in ascertaining any testator's intent 
requires an inquiry into the history of the issue. The various 
state statutes on the subject have been classified in two 
categories, the Missouri type and the Massachussetts type. 
Under the Missouri type statute parole evidence is not 
admissible to show that the testator had not merely forgotten 
the omitted child—the question is simply whether the child was 
name or provided for in the will, and if not he takes his 
intestate share under the statute. The Massachussetts type 
statute provides that a child omitted from a testator's will may 
take his intestate share unless it appears that the omission was 
intentional and not occasioned by accident or mistake. Parol 
evidence is admissible to show that intent. Atkinson, Law of 
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Wills, ch. 3 (2d ed 1953) cited in In re Hilton's Estate, 649 P 
2d 488 (N.M. 1982). 
The appellant relies heavily on the Hilton case inasmuch as 
it interprets a New Mexico statue which in language is identical 
to the Utah pretermitted heir statute. The key to the New 
Mexico court's decision that parol evidence is inadmissible is 
to be found in the prior New Mexico case law rather than the 
unique wording of the Utah and New Mexico statutes. New Mexico 
has a history of following the Missouri rule. Both Missouri and 
Massachussetts type statutes are based on the theory that if a 
testator failed to name or mention a child, he overlooked or 
forgot to name the child and thus the child is entitled to a 
presumption of the same. The framers of the original Uniform 
Probate Code extended the protection of that presumption only to 
children born after the execution of the will. Both New Mexico 
and Utah adopted a change which extended that presumption to 
children born before the execution of the will. Both adopted 
the more specific section at issue, 75-2-3©2(a) without change 
or comment. The framers of the code in their editorial comment 
or the section stated that "This section is not intended to 
alter the rules of evidence applicable to statements of a 
decedent." 
What then was the decision of the New Mexico court in 
Hilton. The court ruled that a no contest clause in the will 
adequately expressed the testator's intent to disinherit certain 
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of his grandchildren. In dicta the court said that extrinsic 
evidence was not admissible, but cited earlier case law based on 
it history using a Missouri type statute. It stated in dicta 
that the disposal of the entire estate to one or more persons 
was not sufficient to indicate an intent to disinherit the 
grandchidren. It cited its own Missouri type heritage in so 
stating as well as citing case law from another state which had 
a Missouri type statute, Oklahoma. 
Utah has a past history of following the Massachussetts 
rule. The most recent case is that of In re Newell's Estate, 
supra. We have already discussed the Newell case as to how it 
contradicts the New Mexico and Oklahoma rules. Under some 
circumstances, the bequest of the entire estate to one person is 
adequate to show the testator's intent to disinherit. It also 
sums up prior Utah case law validating the principal that 
extrinsic evidence is admissible to ascertain the testator's 
intent. The earlier cases of Coulam v. Doull, 9 P 568 and In re 
Atwood's Estate, 45 P 1036 are cited in Newell. 
The question thus becomes whether or not the legislature 
when it passed 75-2-302 intended to discard the past Utah 
tradition of allowing extrinsic evidence. No published comments 
were made at the time of adoption. The legislature did however 
state that the code should be liberally construed to ascertain 
what the decedent intended. See 75-1-102, Utah Code Annotated. 
The better reasoned rule is that evidence should be 
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admitted on the question of intent. 
VI. 
WHEN AN OMITTED CHILD CHOOSES TO CONTEST A WILL 
RATHER THAN ELECT TO TAKE HIS INTESTATE SHARE, 
THE COURT SHOULD CONSIDER THE WHOLE PROBLEM RATHER THAN 
SEPARATE EVIDENCE FOR DIFFERENT PURPOSES. 
When a child is omitted from a will, he has a right to 
contest the will if he reasonably believes that there were 
defects in the preparation or execution of the will. The 
omitted child also has rights under the pretermitted heir 
statute although they may be extinguished. The issues which m 
be raised differ depending on the choice of the omitted child. 
Here, the appellant chose to challenge the capacity of his 
father to make a will. He also chose to challenge the will as 
being procured under influence. That challenge opend the door 
for the admission of extensive evidence to show that the 
decedent understood that he had a son "and that he wanted to 
exclude him from receiving any part of his estate. 
The appellant thus asks the court to consider extensive 
evidence on one subject but asserts that it is totally 
irrelevant on a similar subject. This places a very difficult 
burden on the factfinder to consider the intent of the testato 
and then disregard. It is logically inconsistent as well. 
Logically, the appellant can be said to have given up some of 
the protections of the pretermitted heir statute when he chose 
to challenge the will. Such waiver is similar to the rights o 
a criminal defendant to refrain from testifying. When he 
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chooses to testify he gives up the right to remain silent and 
subjects himself to cross-examination. 
Robert Lee Jones made the decision to challenge the will 
and admit extensive evidence as to his father's dislike of his 
son. Having made that choice, the appellant should be content 
to allow the factfinder to use that evidence for all purposes. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly examined the facts surrounding the 
execution of the will. The will was signed in the presence of 
two qualified witnesses who also signed in the testator's 
presence. The will that was signed is the will which was 
admitted to probate. 
There was no confidential relationship between the decedent 
and Linda Cameron at the time the will was signed. Even if 
there was a confidential relationship, it does not necessarily 
give rise to a presumption of undue influence. There was 
abundant evidence to rebut any presumption of undue influence. 
The will without the aid of extrinsic evidence was 
sufficient to show the testator's intent to exclude his son 
Robert Lee Jones from the estate. The extrinsic which was 
admitted at trial for other purposes would have buttressed the 
finding that the decedent wished to exclude his son. That 
evidence could and should have been considered for all purposes, 
particularly in that appellant opened the door for its 
admission. 
-19-
Accordingly, Respondent Linda Cameron urges this court to 
affirm the decision of the trial court to admit the May 1, 1985 
will to probate and to exclude Robert Lee Jones according to its 
terms. 
Dated t h i s UJ~ day of flJttfM^Aec. 1986 . 
/JP^.XL.WM*^ 
Alan M. Williams 
Attorney for Petitioner/ 
Respondent 
8913 S. Galilee Way 
West Jordan, Utah 84084 
Telephone (801) 566-9709 
Alan M. Williams (3478) 
Attorney for Petitioner/Respondent 
Linda Cameron 
8913 S. Galilee Way 
West Jordan, Utah 84084 
Telephone (801) 566-9709 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate 
of HERBERT LEE JONES, 
Deceased. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Case No. 860232 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of 
petitioner/respondent Linda Cameron's brief in the above 
entitled case ware mailed postage pre-paid to R. Steven Marshall 
and Thomas E. Nelson, Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall, and McCarthy, 
attorneys for petitioner, 50 South Main, Suite 1600, P.O. Box 
45340, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 on the eighteenth (18th) day 
day of November, 1986. 
Dated this Ui day of Vtviudtt^ 1986. 
